Conceptual cartography by Smithson, Robert
Conceptual cartography
Robert Smithson
Department of Philosophy & Religion, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, NC, USA
ABSTRACT
Certain features of our conceptual scheme seem necessary for subjects with our
basic nature: we cannot imagine humans accomplishing their basic projects
without having a conceptual scheme with these features. Other aspects of our
conceptual scheme seem more contingent: we can imagine communities
effectively using a somewhat different conceptual scheme. Conceptual
cartography is the project of investigating the necessity and contingency of
the various features of conceptual schemes. The project of conceptual
cartography has not received much explicit methodological attention. But in
this paper, I argue that conceptual cartography has important implications for
the study of conceptual engineering. I also provide a general framework for
thinking about conceptual cartography.
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1. Introduction
Consider the concept true. This concept may initially seem like a redundant
part of our conceptual scheme; after all, the sentence ‘Grass is green is
true’ seems to say the same thing as ‘Grass is green’. But now consider
the sentence ‘Everything John said at the conference yesterday was
true’. It is easier to use this sentence than to try to list every specific
claim John made the day before. So we might say that the concept true
is a necessary part of our conceptual scheme in the following sense:
without this concept, a community (with our expressive needs) would
be worse off.
By contrast, certain features of our conceptual scheme seem contin-
gent. For example, imagine a community that uses a concept that is
similar to but not identical to our concept game; we might imagine that
members of this community classify soccer, chess, and bridge as games,
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but they never call an activity with only one participant a game. There is
nothing obviously defective with using this alternative concept. So we
might say that our concept game is contingent in the following sense: a
community (sharing our same general interests) could just as well have
used some alternative concept.
I will call the project of determining the necessity and contingency of
the various features of conceptual schemes conceptual cartography.1
When engaged in conceptual cartography, we are mapping the space
of possible conceptual schemes with respect to their suitability for
different possible linguistic communities. Conceptual cartography has
not received much explicit methodological attention. But as I discuss
below, conceptual cartography has important implications for the study
of conceptual engineering (as well as many other topics in metaphysics
and epistemology).
I will develop a framework for conceptual cartography in section 3
before considering specific examples of this project in sections 5–6.
But first, I will discuss why we should care about cartography in the
first place.
2. The significance of cartography
Hirsch (1993, viii) claims that ‘the nature of the constraints on lexicons is a
fundamental question for philosophy’. In this section, I will explain why
philosophers should care about these constraints.
Conceptual engineering: Conceptual engineering addresses the ques-
tion of which conceptual scheme we ought to use.2 For example, not-
withstanding how the terms ‘race’ and ‘gender’ are actually used, how
ought we to use these terms in order to promote social justice? Not-
withstanding how the term ‘true’ is actually used, how ought we to
use this term in order to avoid certain types of paradox and
inconsistency?
There are important connections between engineering and cartogra-
phy. Assuming that ‘ought’ implies ‘can,’ arguments about the necessity/
contingency of aspects of our conceptual scheme are relevant to the
very possibility of revising concepts in a given domain.3 For example, if
intentional concepts turned out to be (in some sense4) necessary features
1For now, I leave the relevant notions of necessity and contingency intuitive. I clarify how these notions
should be understand in 3.4.
2For discussion, see, e.g., Burgess (2013), Burgess and Plunkett (2013), Eklund (2015), Plunkett (2015,
2016), Cappelen (2018), and Cappelen and Plunkett (2020). I will clarify the different ways in which phi-
losophers understand the project of conceptual engineering in section 4.
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of our conceptual scheme, it would tell against any proposal to eliminate
intentional explanations in favour of neuroscientific explanations.5
Contrariwise, arguments for conceptual contingency may support the
possibility of revising concepts in a certain area. In section 6, I will
present an argument to the effect that our specific concept of causation
is contingent (i.e. that there are different causal concepts that are well
suited for human communities). Having recognized this contingency, we
can ask: what causal concept ought physicists to use? Is it the same
causal concept that biologists ought to use? Is it the same causal
concept that people should use in everyday life?
There are other connections between cartography and engineering, but
I will postpone discussing these issues until after I have presented the fra-
mework for conceptual cartography in section 3. I will return to the topic of
conceptual engineering in section 4.
Metaphysical caution: It can be tempting to view features of our concep-
tual scheme as corresponding to natural features of the mind-indepen-
dent world. For example, the fact that our conceptual scheme contains
a certain concept X may tempt us to assume that X is a natural property.
But now suppose we come to recognize that this feature is contingent: we
could have used a language where X is replaced by a concept with some-
what different application conditions. This should undermine our confi-
dence that X is a natural property.
For example, many philosophers believe that the term ‘cause’ expresses
a natural relation. But in section 6, I consider an argument to the effect that
our causal concept is contingent: there are different (although similar)
causal concepts that are well suited for human use. If this is so, it may
undermine the claim that there is anything natural about our actual
term ‘cause’ (and the property it expresses).
Deflationary implications: For any philosophically interesting item X,
there are many competing theories regarding the nature of X. For
example, philosophers have offered dozens of analyses of knowledge, of
free will, of dispositions, and so on. But now suppose we realize that our
community could just as well have used some term ‘knowledge*’ that is
similar to but not identical to ‘knowledge’. Then why care about giving
our actual term ‘knowledge’ (or the property it expresses) a precise
analysis?6
3For related discussion, see Cappelen (2018, ch. 18), Cappelen and Plunkett (2020, section 3), and Eklund
(2020) on ‘conceptual fixed points’. I return to this issue in 4.1 below.
4I clarify the relevant notion(s) of necessity in 3.4.
5For related discussion, see, e.g., Churchland (1981), Hornsby (2001), and D’Oro (2012).
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Revisionary theories: Arguments for conceptual necessity may help
deflect certain types of revisionary philosophical conclusions. For
example, some philosophers of physics have claimed that results from fun-
damental physics undermine our ordinary belief in the existence of space.7
But suppose that spatial concepts are necessary features of our concep-
tual scheme. Then we might doubt that results from fundamental physics
are able to undermine our ordinary belief in the existence of space. We
might instead conclude that our ordinary conceptual scheme must be
different from the conceptual scheme operative in fundamental physics.8
Sceptical arguments: Conceptual contingency can help motivate various
sceptical problems. For example, in section 6, I will consider an argument to
the effect that the projectibility of the predicate ‘green’ is a contingent
feature of our language. This amounts to the claim that there are no com-
pelling reasons for preferring our favoured inductive inferences over the
ones favoured by grue-speakers. Similarly, if our normative concepts are
contingent, this might support moral relativism (see Eklund (2015) for
related discussion). Contrariwise, arguments for the necessity of certain con-
ceptual features can support anti-sceptical and anti-relativist conclusions.
3. A framework
To this point, I have relied on several intuitive examples to motivate the
project of conceptual cartography. In this section, I will provide a frame-
work that will help to identify, taxonomize, and analyse the many
examples of conceptual cartography presented in sections 5–6.
Conceptual cartographers map the features of a conceptual scheme
that are necessary or contingent for a given linguistic community. To
provide a framework for this project, I will describe the relevant ways in
which both conceptual schemes and linguistic communities may differ
from one another.
3.1. Conceptual features
Here are examples of some of the features that may distinguish one con-
ceptual scheme from another:
6Of course, it may still be interesting to learn about the specific contours of a community’s actual concep-
tual scheme. But it no longer seems pressing to provide an analysis that avoids every possible
counterexample.
7See, e.g., Ney (2012).
8See Smithson (2018) for related discussion.
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(i) Concept inclusion: Perhaps the most obvious way in which conceptual
schemes differ is by including different concepts. For example: English
in the year 1800 did not have terms expressing concepts such as auto-
mobile, the internet, or sexual harassment, but English today does.
(ii) Inference rules: Within typical languages, there are rules for moving
from some assertible sentences to others. For example, there are
deductive rules of inference associated with each of English’s
logical expressions.9 Similarly, certain inductive inferences are con-
sidered permissible (e.g. ‘The Sun has risen every day in the past,
and therefore the sun will rise tomorrow’.). There is no need to
provide a precise account of these rules; I simply assume that these
rules are one way two conceptual schemes may differ.
(iii) Conceptual primitives: In English, the term ‘grue’ is semantically
derivative from terms like ‘green’, ‘blue’, and so on. By contrast, it is
commonly supposed that, in the ‘grue-language,’ terms like ‘green’
are semantically derivative from terms like ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’. So
schemes can differ in their relations of semantic priority.10
(iv) Logical form: On a more abstract level, conceptual schemes can differ
in logical form. For example, English contains sentences of the form
Fa, where a is a proper name. But in a predicate-functor language
(see Quine (1971)), there are no terms that serve as proper names.
Similarly, we might distinguish schemes with (only) objectual
quantification from schemes with (only) substitutional quantification,
schemes with descriptivist analyses of proper names from schemes
with Millian treatments of proper names, and so on.
The above list is not meant to be exhaustive. Nor is it put forth as the
one ‘correct’ way of taxonomizing conceptual features. How we should
taxonomize conceptual features will instead depend on the specific area
of conceptual cartography that interests us.11
9We might think of deductive inference rules as following from the inferential roles of the logical concepts.
If so, then deductive inference rules are already addressed with (i).
10While the grue example involves terms with explicit definitions, there may also be relations of semantic
priority that do not involve explicit definition. For example, Chalmers (2012) argues that the concept
knows is semantically derivative from concepts like believes, true, and so on, even though knows prob-
ably has no explicit definition.
11Here are two notable absences from the above list.
(1) Orthography and phonology: These features are not usually relevant to conceptual cartography. For
this reason, I typically use the term ‘conceptual scheme’ rather than ‘language’ throughout this
paper.
(2) History/genealogy: Historical/genealogical differences between languages are certainly relevant to
conceptual cartography. But as it happens, I plan to subsume issues relating to history and geneal-
ogy within one of the ‘community features’ of 3.2. Of course, other taxonomies are possible.
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3.2. Community features
I next present several community features: features that distinguish linguis-
tic communities from one another.
(i) Interests/projects/values: I use the term ‘interest’ broadly to subsume
anything that members of a given community care about. A scientific
community may have interests in making predictions, manipulating
nature, developing vaccines, and so on. An activist community may
have interests in promoting social justice, creating a more equal
society, and so on. Humans, as a general community, typically have
interests such as exploring their environment, learning, living
morally, surviving and reproducing, acquiring an objective conception
of theworld, creating art, wondering about life after death, and so on. I
will refer to this last set as characteristically human interests.
(ii) Environment/context: I use the term ‘environment’ broadly to include
a community’s physical environment, history, social location, and
anything else external to the subject that may be relevant to the suit-
ability of a conceptual scheme. For example, environments/contexts
might include planet earth, a philosophy conference on ontology, a
political rally, and so on. Which environment/context a community
inhabits will affect which features of their conceptual scheme are
necessary vs. contingent. For a simple example, the concept snow
may be necessary for communities in cold environments but
unnecessary for communities in hot environments.
The above examples show that both interests and environments
can be individuated in more or less fine-grained ways. This corre-
sponds to the fact that, when engaged in conceptual cartography,
we are sometimes interested in very general communities (e.g. the
human community, the community of all possible language users)
and sometimes interested in very specific communities (e.g. aca-
demic philosophers, one’s immediate family).
(iii) Affective states: I use the term ‘affective states’ to include all feelings
and emotions as well as all dispositions to enter these states. Under
this heading,wemight include: a feeling of resentment towards a neg-
ligent doctor, a feeling of inspiration when reading Dostoevsky, the
intuitive feeling that green objects are more similar than grue
objects, the intuitive feeling that cars are more natural than Hirsch’s
(1993, 26) incars and outcars, and so on. Of course, we can imagine
subjects (perhaps aliens) who feel differently.
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(iv) Faculties: Humans have certain cognitive limitations: limitations on
their memory, limitations on the complexity of their thoughts, limit-
ations on the number of concepts they can possess, and so on. We
can imagine subjects where these limitations are more or less
severe. Human cognition also involves certain specific forms of judg-
ments, such as subject-predicate judgments. I will subsume these
types of features under the heading of ‘cognitive faculties’. It seems
possible that certain communities (aliens?) could have different
cognitive faculties.
Communities may differ in their sensory faculties as well. Humans
have certain types of spatial experiences, temporal experiences, pro-
prioceptive experiences, and so on, while bats have, e.g. echolocation
experiences. These faculties are sometimes relevant to the necessity/
contingency of a certain feature of a community’s conceptual
scheme.
Just as before, the above list is not meant to be exhaustive or the
uniquely ‘correct’ way of taxonomizing community factors. How we
should taxonomize those factors will depend on our interests.
3.3: The space of communities
Having distinguished various features of communities, I represent the
space of possible linguistic communities in Figure 1. From this diagram,
we see that communities overlap and intersect in many ways. At the
most general level, we have the set of all possible linguistic communities.
One level down, there are communities whose members share certain
sensory faculties, certain cognitive faculties, and so on.
The organization in this diagram is to some extent arbitrary. But one
advantage of the Figure 1 carving is that a certain particularly interesting
set of communities – human communities – are grouped together. So we
can easily ‘zoom in’ on that section (Figure 2).
The central region in Figure 2 is the space of human communities. I rep-
resent these communities as sharing four features: human cognitive fac-
ulties, human sensory faculties, human interests, and human affective
states. For example, the ellipse labelled ‘human sensory faculties’ contains
communities whose members have the same types of sensory experiences
that humans do (e.g. object-directed experiences, 3D spatial experiences).
Similarly, the ellipse labelled ‘human affective states’ contains commu-
nities whose members have the same feelings of disgust and the same
INQUIRY 7
feelings about similarity classes that humans do. Similarly, the ellipse
labelled ‘human interests’ contains communities whose members share
the characteristically human interests mentioned in 3.2.
Figure 1. The space of possible linguistic communities.
Figure 2. Communities sharing features of human communities.
8 R. SMITHSON
As discussed in section 6, many examples of conceptual cartography
involve comparing humans to subjects who differ from humans along
one of the above dimensions. But for now, I will focus on the space of
human communities itself (Figure 3).
There are certain interests shared by all or most humans. But people also
have contingent interests that vary from context to context, and these con-
tingent interests may influence the conceptual scheme that is appropriate
for them to use. For example, some ontologists (e.g. Sider 2014) have
claimed that we ought to use the ‘joint-carving’ quantifiers of ‘Ontologese’
when studying fundamental ontology, even if such quantifiers are impractical
in everyday life. To capture this kind of case, Figure 3 breaks down the set of
human communities into regions corresponding to the different contingent
interests humans might have. We can distinguish contingent interests in
more or less fine-grained ways, depending on the case.12
Although any community will have some contingent interest or
other, I have left a gap surrounding the ellipses in Figure 3. This is a
representational convenience: it allows me to locate conceptual fea-
tures that are necessary for any human in the gap region. I will
discuss this point in 3.5.
Descending one more time (Figure 4), we reach the level of specific
human communities (in this case: specific scientific communities). This
level represents the different environments where humans might find
Figure 3. The space of human communities.
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themselves. For example, the language suitable for a scientist may differ
depending on whether she is giving a conference paper, a public
lecture, or a talk with family members. It may also differ depending on
the world’s microphysical structure. (For the same reason just mentioned,
I have left a gap around the ellipses in Figure 4.)
3.4. The relevant notions of necessity/contingency
With community maps, we can interpret conceptual cartography as the
project of locating conceptual features within the space of communities
according to their necessity and contingency for those communities. But
what kind of necessity and contingency? So far, I have left this matter intui-
tive, but I will now clarify how to understand these notions.
In fact, there are different types of necessity/contingency relevant to
conceptual cartography. In this section, I will describe three major types:
psychological, linguistic, and pragmatic.
Psychological necessity/contingency: In some cases, a subject’s psycho-
logical makeup will constrain the conceptual schemes available to them.
For example, it is plausible that, given our own psychological makeup,
humans must employ conceptual schemes containing sentences with
subject-predicate form. It is difficult to imagine a (psychologically realistic)
Figure 4. The space of human scientific communities.
12Of course, the boundaries between communities are often fuzzy. So community maps involve a certain
amount of idealization.
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human community employing, e.g. a predicate-functor language in every-
day life.
Under the broad heading of psychological necessity/contingent, we can
distinguish narrower species. For example, certain conceptual features
may be necessary/contingent for communities sharing a certain type of
cognitive faculty. Similarly, certain conceptual features may be necess-
ary/contingent for communities sharing a certain biological makeup.
Linguistic necessity/contingency: There may also be conceptual features
that are a part of any possible language whatsoever. Intuitively, these con-
ceptual necessities follow from (or are implicit in) the very nature of a
language itself. For example, consider Davidson’s (1974) argument that it
is a condition on regarding a system X as a language at all that X be trans-
latable into our language. If Davidson is correct, then such intertranslatabil-
ity will be a necessary conceptual feature for any linguistic community.
We can also distinguish narrower species of linguistic necessity. These
will apply to conceptual features that must be a part of any conceptual
scheme meeting some further condition. For example, let C be the con-
dition: having the expressive power to talk freely about its own
expressions. Let F be the (negative) feature: lacking the power to
express both the classical truth functions and the property being true
(here conceived of as a property satisfying the T-schema). Then, on the
present framework, Tarski’s Theorem asserts that F is linguistically necess-
ary for any community employing a language satisfying C.13
(One further benefit of focusing on narrower types of linguistic neces-
sity is that it may help prevent terminological disputes over precisely
which systems count as languages. For example, do honeybee dance com-
munication systems count as languages?)
Pragmatic necessity/contingency: There is also a sense in which a com-
munity’s values and projects (see 3.2) constrain the conceptual schemes
available to it. To motivate this idea, I will begin with the natural sugges-
tion that a given conceptual feature is more or less suitable for a given
community to the extent that it helps the community promote its
values (or succeed in its projects).
The conceptual features suitable for a given community will of course
depend on that community’s specific values and projects. For example,
Burgess and Plunkett (2013) mention a variety of goods we might wish
to promote through our choice of language: knowledge, social justice,
13See Eklund (2017, section 1) for discussion of this example.
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ideological parsimony, honesty, etc. We can divide these examples into
various classes: epistemic goods, moral goods, political goods, and so on.
Accordingly, we can say that a given scheme is epistemically best suited
for a certain community iff no other scheme better promotes epistemic
goods for that community. Similarly, a scheme is morally best suited for a
certain community iff no other scheme better promotes moral goods for
that community. (If there is no uniquely best scheme, then multiple
schemes will count as best suited in this sense.)
In some cases, these values may compete. Burgess and Plunkett (2013,
1105) present the case of a politician whose political ambitions would be
better served by using the established concepts of race and gender, even
though using more reflective concepts would better promote social
justice. In this case, there is a potential conflict between prudential and
moral goods. So we might allow for a given scheme’s being all-things-con-
sidered best suited for a certain community as well.
I now turn from conceptual schemes to the features characterizing
them. Let F be a certain conceptual feature. Then we can say:
F is pragmatically14 (epistemically, morally,…) necessary for a community iff all
(epistemically, morally,…) best suited languages for that community contain F.
F is pragmatically (epistemically, morally,…) contingent for a community iff some
but not all (epistemically, morally,…) best suited languages for that community
contain F.
For example, it is not psychologically necessary for scientists to employ the
concept law of nature. But perhaps it is epistemically necessary for them to
do so, in the sense that it best enables them to accomplish certain episte-
mic goals implicit in scientific inquiry.
Summary: I have described three senses in which a given conceptual
feature might be necessary/contingent for a community with certain fea-
tures. As in earlier sections, the above list is not meant to be exhaustive.
But the above categories cover the various examples of conceptual carto-
graphy I discuss in sections 5 and 6.
3.5. Conventions
I now return to the community maps from 3.3, introducing some conven-
tions for representing conceptual necessity and contingency on these
maps. If a feature F is labelled within the ‘gap space’ of a region R, then
14Here, I use the term ‘pragmatic necessity’ because, roughly, F is a feature that C requires in its conceptual
scheme in order to best achieve its goals (whatever those goals turn out to be).
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this means that F is necessary for R-communities (including the sub-
regions of R). So, for example: in Figure 5, the concept true is represented
as necessary for communities sharing human cognitive faculties. (This is
merely an illustration, not a substantive philosophical claim.)
There are two conventions for representing contingency. First: if F is
included within a sub-region R*, then F is contingent for regions encom-
passing R*. For example, in Figure 5, the concept blame is represented
as contingent for the community of subjects sharing human cognitive
faculties.
Second: if features separated by slashes are included in region R, then
those features are contingent for R-communities. For example, in Figure 5,
I have depicted the existential quantifier ∃O (the one we use in ordinary
language) as contingent for communities sharing human sensible fac-
ulties. (Here, ∃1, ∃2,… are alternative quantifiers that we might have
used instead). With this second convention, we can represent contingent
features without locating them in some more specific community.
4. Conceptual cartography and conceptual engineering
Using the above framework, I will now explain the relevance of conceptual
cartography to the project of conceptual engineering.
Figure 5. Conventions for community maps.
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In the recent literature, philosophers have understood the project of
conceptual engineering15 in many ways.16 For example, on one usage,
‘conceptual engineering’ refers to the prescriptive project of changing,
negotiating, or revising how a community uses their concepts (or linguistic
expressions).17 On a second usage, ‘conceptual engineering’ refers to the
normative project of evaluating concepts (or linguistic expressions) along
various dimensions.18
But in order to remain neutral on the many questions over which con-
ceptual engineers disagree, I will instead adopt Cappelen and Plunkett’s
(2020) ‘broad tent’ usage on which conceptual engineering subsumes
any of the general cluster of issues intuitively related to the assessment
and improvement of our representational devices.19 Below, I outline
some of the important connections between cartography and conceptual
engineering in this broad sense.
4.1: Conceptual fixed points
One central question for conceptual engineers is whether there are concep-
tual fixed points: concepts or terms that are impossible to revise or adjust.20
If there are such fixed points, there is no point in trying to improve the con-
cepts in question. According to Cappelen and Plunkett (2020, section 3),
philosophers who appeal to such ‘bedrock concepts’ face a central chal-
lenge: ‘to identify in a principled way the bedrock concepts and explain
what makes them more fixed than those that can be engineered’.
Conceptual cartography provides a framework for considering this chal-
lenge. On this framework, conceptual fixed points are concepts that are (in
some sense) necessary for a given linguistic community.21 But as seen in 3.4,
15Some philosophers distinguish conceptual engineering from conceptual ethics, while others use these
labels interchangeably. I agree with Cappelen and Plunkett (2020, section 1) that one can translate
back and forth between different ways of using these labels. So, for simplicity, I will just use the
label ‘conceptual engineering’ in the discussion below.
16I thank an anonymous referee for recommending clarification on this point. For a useful overview of the
clusters of issues discussed under the banners of conceptual engineering, see Cappelen (2018), Cappelen
and Plunkett (2020), and Eklund (2020).
17For example, Richard (2020), Sawyer (2020), Sterken (2020), and Thomasson (2020) seem to use the term
‘conceptual engineering’ in this way. Philosophers have offered different views on how such change
occurs (e.g., by eliminating and replacing concepts, or by changing their extension, or by changing
the community’s conception of the item in question, etc.). For relevant discussion, see the issues
listed under ‘Cluster 1’ in Cappelen and Plunkett (2020, section 3).
18This is roughly how Burgess and Plunkett (2013) and McPherson and Plunkett (2020) use the label ‘con-
ceptual ethics’. Eklund (2017) explicitly distinguishes between the prescriptive and normative versions of
conceptual engineering.
19Relatedly, Cappelen and Plunkett (2020, section 2) offer a ‘bottom-up’ characterization of conceptual
engineering via providing a list of paradigmatic examples of the project; this characterization is
helpful because of its theoretical neutrality.
20For discussion, see Cappelen (2018, ch. 18), Cappelen and Plunkett (2020, section 3), and Eklund (2020).
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there are different types of conceptual necessity. For example, one kind of
fixed point would be a conceptual feature that is psychologically necessary
(i.e. necessary for any community with our same psychological makeup).
A second kind of fixed point would be a conceptual feature that is linguisti-
cally necessary (i.e. necessary for any system to count as a language at all).22
The current framework shows that we can make other fine-grained dis-
tinctions as well. A certain conceptual feature may be necessary for a com-
munity with certain features but not for others. Or a certain conceptual
feature may be (conditionally) necessary for languages of a certain type,
but not for others (consider, e.g. the truth predicate example discussed
in 3.4). The flexibility offered by these fine-grained distinctions should
be useful to philosophers studying conceptual fixed points.
As for how to identify bedrock concepts: I will discuss several forms of
argument establishing conceptual necessity in section 5. This discussion
will suggest some methods for approaching the question of identifying
bedrock concepts in a principled way.
4.2: Pragmatic necessity and conceptual engineering
Next, I will consider the connection between conceptual engineering and
pragmatic necessity. Suppose we want to promote (say) moral value with
our choice of language. Then it seems we ought to choose a language
with whatever conceptual features best promote moral value. But this,
roughly speaking, is just what it means for a conceptual feature to be
morally (pragmatically) necessary for our community (see 3.4). So, general-
izing, the question of which concepts a community ought to use is
(roughly23) equivalent to the question of which conceptual features are
pragmatically necessary for that community.
21Although, it should be said, the current framework also allows for conceptual features other than con-
cepts—see 3.1.
22By contrast, pragmatically necessary concepts need not (in general) be ‘fixed’ in the current sense; I
discuss the connection between conceptual engineering and pragmatic necessity in 4.2.
23The reason for this qualification is that, as Eklund (2020, section 2) observes, there is a difference
between the ‘activist’ project of trying to improve our concepts and the ‘theoretical’ project of evaluat-
ing our concepts (along various dimensions). He offers the following example: ‘one can think that con-
sequentialist normative concepts are the ones that get at the features that really matter normatively,
while at the same time—and on consequentialist grounds—think that it would be bad if agents
making decisions about how to act deployed consequentialist concepts’.
Does the fact that conceptual feature F is the best (along some dimension) for a community imply
that this community must (i.e., ought to) use a language with F? (I thank an anonymous referee for
raising this question.) The present discussion shows that the answer is ‘no’; for example, Eklund’s
case is one where consequentialist normative concepts are best (along a certain dimension of evalu-
ation) but we ought not use a language with these concepts. More generally, the pragmatic necessity
of a certain conceptual feature does not imply that it is normatively necessary for a community to adopt
a language with that feature.
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Given this connection, the framework of section 3 has several benefits
for the study of conceptual engineering. First, it suggests that conceptual
engineering – considered here as a general philosophical method – may
have wider scope than has previously been recognized.24 Unsurprisingly,
discussions of conceptual engineering have tended to focus on which con-
cepts are best for actual human communities. For example, no conceptual
engineer would ever recommend that we adopt a language foregoing
subject-predicate logical form, or a language containing terms like ‘grue’
and ‘bleen’. But perhaps such features are pragmatically necessary for
other possible linguistic communities, and the framework of section 3 is
flexible enough to allow us to analyse such cases. While these cases
have no practical relevance for our own choice of conceptual scheme,
these features still interest philosophers because of their relevance to
topics like scepticism and deflationism (see section 2 for discussion). So
these topics may have connections to conceptual engineering that have
not received much attention.
Second, proponents of conceptual engineering can use the framework
of community maps (see section 3.3) to make fine-grained claims about
what concepts a community ought to use given the specific features had
by that community.25 For example, instead of merely claiming that we
ought to use a truth predicate, we can further claim that the predicate
‘true’ is pragmatically necessary for any community with our expressive
needs and cognitive limitations (see section 1 for this example).
Finally, the connection between conceptual engineering and pragmatic
necessity suggests models for how one might defend or critique specific
proposals for engineering our concepts. For example, the types of argu-
ments philosophers have used to establish conceptual necessity can
serve as models for how to defend proposals in conceptual engineering.
I discuss these types of arguments in section 5. Similarly, the types of argu-
ments philosophers have used to establish conceptual contingency (see
section 6) can serve as models for how to critique proposals in conceptual
engineering.
For example, section 6 will address how genealogical arguments can be
used to establish conceptual necessity/contingency. So, in turn, this dis-
cussion will reveal ways in which genealogy is relevant to conceptual
engineering.26
24Cf. Cappelen and Plunkett’s (2020, section 3) discussion of the interpretative question of how often phi-
losophers are already engaged in conceptual engineering.




To this point, I have provided a framework for conceptual cartography and
have explained some of the connections between this project and concep-
tual engineering. My aim in the next two sections will be to describe some
of the many philosophical projects that can be interpreted using this fra-
mework. Section 5 presents arguments for conceptual necessity, while
section 6 presents arguments for contingency.
Of course, I do not claim that conceptual cartography is the only useful
way to interpret the examples below. Nor do I claim that the philosophers
mentioned below conceive of themselves as engaged in conceptual carto-
graphy. I only claim that conceptual cartography provides a useful, unify-
ing framework for thinking about many of the projects that interest
philosophers.
5. Arguments for necessity
Here are three common ways to establish the necessity of a conceptual
feature.
Transcendental arguments: In the current context, a transcendental
argument is an argument to the effect that a community could not have
a certain feature that it has without employing a language with a certain
kind of feature.27
Perhaps the most famous examples of transcendental arguments (in
the current sense) are from Kant’s (1998) Critique of Pure Reason. In the
Metaphysical Deduction (A66–83, B92–116), Kant derives certain a priori
concepts from the specific logical forms of thoughts that humans can
entertain. For example, Kant argues that it is a condition on the possi-
bility of forming hypothetical judgments (that is, judgments of the
form if A, then B) that subjects have a certain a priori concept of causa-
tion.28 So we might interpret Kant as arguing that the concept of causa-
tion is necessary for any subject with human cognitive faculties.
Davidson (1974) argues that it is a condition on the possibility of a com-
munity being a linguistic community at all that its language be translata-
ble into our language. Davidson claims that this is a necessary condition
for our being able to interpret that community as even having a language.
26See Plunkett (2016) and Cappelen and Plunkett (2020, section 3) for discussion.
27Under this label, we might also include arguments to the effect that a given language could not have a
certain feature that it has without also having some other feature (see, e.g., the truth-predicate example
in the discussion of linguistic necessity in 3.4).
28See Longuenesse (1998, 346ff) for discussion.
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Within the current framework, Davidson is arguing that the feature of inter-
translatability with our language is (linguistically) necessary for the entire
set of linguistic communities.
Strawson (1962) argues that the concept free is tightly bound to the
reactive attitudes of gratitude, anger, sympathy, and resentment. In
addition, these attitudes themselves are natural and inescapable for
human persons. Putting these points together, Strawson can be viewed
as giving an argument for a certain type of necessity for the concept
free (and related concepts involving moral responsibility). According to
Strawson, the appropriateness of such concepts does not depend, e.g.
on whether our environment is deterministic. Rather, they are necessary
for any subjects with our affective states (including our reactive attitudes).
Pragmatic arguments: In a pragmatic argument for conceptual neces-
sity, a philosopher starts with some claim about a project or value that
is important to a certain community. It is then argued that a certain linguis-
tic feature is necessary for accomplishing those projects or promoting
those values.
For example, advocates of the deflationary theory of truth (see, e.g.
Horwich (1990)) have observed that we need a truth predicate in situations
where we can only indirectly express a proposition. For example, we might
say ‘What Rachel said at the conference was true’ in situations where we
do not remember what exactly Rachel said. Similarly, we need a truth pre-
dicate in situations where we need to generalize over propositions (e.g.
‘Everything that Rachel said at the conference was true’). These arguments
suggest that there is a certain type of necessity for the concept true: any
community with our expressive interests (and cognitive limitations)
requires a truth concept.
Enoch and Schechter (2008) discuss basic belief-forming methods:
methods that support our use of other belief-forming methods but that
are not in turns supported by any other methods. They argue that such
methods – for example, inference to the best explanation (IBE) – can be
justified pragmatically:
Consider the explanatory project, the project of understanding and explaining
the world around us. This project is of fundamental importance to us. Indeed,
it seems that engaging in this project is central to rationality; a thinker who
does not inquire about the world around him is intuitively doing something
wrong. This counts in favour of employing whatever methods are necessary
for successfully engaging in the explanatory project. It is plausible that employ-
ing IBE (or a close relative) is needed for successfully engaging in the
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explanatory project. And this explains why we are justified in employing IBE as a
basic rule in our thought.29 (549)
Enoch and Schechter’s pragmatic argument suggests a certain type of
necessity for the inference rule of IBE: any community interested in the
explanatory project of understanding the world will have to rely on this
form of inference.30
Counterfactual arguments: In a counterfactual argument, a philosopher
considers what a community would be like if they started using a language
without a certain feature. If they would be worse off (or more concretely: if
they would revert to the original language), this helps support the claim
that the feature in question is necessary for that community.
Roberts (2016, 348–349) considers a possible world where – according to
the non-Humean – the real laws of nature diverge from the ‘ideally apparent
laws’ (i.e. the regularities that scientists would in principle pick out as the
laws if they were magically afforded a God’s eye glimpse of the entire
Humean base). Roberts argues that, in this case, we would not care about
the ‘real laws’ and would instead re-appropriate the term ‘laws of nature’
for the ideally apparent laws. This is because the ideally apparent laws are
the ones that serve us best for ‘all purposes of prediction, manipulation of
nature, building better engines, building better telescopes, curing disease,
finding explanations that give satisfaction to our feelings of curiosity,’ and
so on (348–349). If Roberts is correct, it suggests a certain (pragmatic) neces-
sity for the Humean concept of lawhood: languages with this concept are
necessary for any community sharing our scientific interests.
In Smithson (2018), I consider a thought experiment where subjects
become convinced by arguments from the philosophy of physics to the
effect that ordinary objects and ordinary space do not exist. For this
reason, the subjects in question temporarily abandon their ordinary judg-
ments about objects and space. But I argue that these subjects would
revert to talking about objects and space whenever they returned to the
business of everyday life. If this argument is correct, it suggests a certain
necessity for concepts like space and object: these concepts are necessary
29This passage suggests a transcendental element to the argument as well. Enoch and Schechter recognize
that the project of explaining the world around us is not merely a project that humans contingently
happen to have (in the way, e.g., that a person might happen to have the project of running marathons).
Instead, this project is ‘central to rationality’. So, we might also interpret Enoch and Schecter as giving
the following transcendental justification for IBE: it is condition on a subject’s being rational that they
(attempt to) employ the inference rule of IBE. So IBE will be necessary for any community with rational
cognitive faculties.
30See also Schechter and Enoch (2006), who provide an analogous pragmatic argument for the necessity of
modus ponens.
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for any community with our everyday experiences and interests (even if
that community lives in a physical environment where it is difficult to fit
objects and space into the scientific image).
I represent the above (alleged) necessities in Figure 6.
6 Arguments for contingency
Turning now to arguments for conceptual contingency, I will again group
the examples under three main headings:
Argument by example: The simplest way to show that a conceptual
feature is contingent for a community is simply to identify or imagine a
scheme that seems well suited for the community but that does not
contain the feature in question. For example, Wittgenstein (1953) repeat-
edly asks his reader to imagine language games that are different from the
ones that we find in everyday life; we can view such examples as showing
the contingency of many aspects of our conceptual scheme. Similarly, in
the Blue Book, Wittgenstein (1958, 61) argues that features of our concep-
tual scheme relating to personal identity have a certain contingency: these
features would not be included in schemes well suited for communities in
different environments than our actual community.31
Next, consider Hirsch’s (1993) argumentative strategy in Dividing Reality.
Hirsch asks (3): what makes our classificatory practices ‘more correct or
rational’ than alternative practices we can imagine? To investigate this
question, he imagines various ‘strange languages,’ such as one using the
concepts incar and outcar. An incar is a car (or part of a car) that is in a
garage, while an outcar is a car (or part of a car) that is out of a garage.
So backing a car out of a garage gradually erases an incar while creating
an outcar. While this seems strange, Hirsch argues that a community
using the incar/outcar language is no worse off with respect to such pro-
jects as gaining knowledge, learning languages, making predictions, and
describing the world. We can interpret this as an argument for a certain
type of contingency for the concept car: communities sharing many of
our epistemic projects and interests would be no worse off using the
incar/outcar alternative.
31Says Wittgenstein (1958, 61): ‘Or imagine that it were usual for human beings to have two characters, in
this way: People’s shape, size and characteristics of behaviour periodically undergo a complete change. It
is the usual thing for a man to have two such states, and he lapses suddenly from one into the other. It is
very likely that in such a society we should be inclined to christen every man with two names, and
perhaps to talk of the pair of persons in his body. Now were Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde two persons or
were they the same person who merely changed? We can say whichever we like. We are not forced
to talk of a double personality’.
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Next, consider causal pluralism. As I use the term, causal pluralism is the
view that there are different types of relations that might deserve the
name ‘causation’. For example, Hitchcock (2003, 10) considers the follow-
ing case: ‘Two assassins, Captain and Assistant, are on a mission to kill
Victim. Upon spotting Victim, Captain yells “fire!”, and Assistant fires. Over-
hearing the order, Victim ducks and survives unscathed’. In this case, we
have conflicting intuitions about whether Captain’s order caused
Victim’s survival. According to Hitchcock, the best explanation of these
conflicting intuitions is that the term ‘cause’ expresses different types of
causal relations. If this is correct, this argument shows a certain contin-
gency (at the level of human communities) in our causal concepts: there
might be different causal concepts that are well suited for human use.
Other examples come from feminist philosophy, where philosophers
have resisted certain dualisms in our ordinary conceptual scheme. For
example, it may be the case that many people today use a conceptual
scheme where sex is binary: one is either male or female and there are
no other options. But feminist philosophers have noted that there are
other ways we might use such terms. For example, we could use a
Figure 6. Conceptual necessities.
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scheme that includes intersex and other categories. One can interpret this
argument as demonstrating a certain contingency in our concepts relating
to sex, gender, and race: a community similar to ours in many respects
(but, perhaps, more concerned with equity) could use concepts of sex,
gender, and race differently than how they are currently used by default
in our society.32
Genealogical arguments: In a genealogical argument, a philosopher
traces the historical development of a conceptual feature. Such an inves-
tigation may reveal that said feature is necessary: we cannot imagine a
community developing without that feature. But it may also reveal that
said feature is contingent: we can imagine communities (perhaps with
similar interests, or perhaps with somewhat different but still intelligible
interests) developing language in other ways. In the latter case, such an
investigation provides an argument for contingency: if our history had
been somewhat different, we would have employed different conceptual
features.
Blanchette (2017) traces the genealogy of the contemporary logical
concepts independence and model from antecedent concepts found in
nineteenth-century geometry. Blanchette argues that our contemporary
concepts are not mere refinements of the older geometric concepts.
Instead, she argues that newer concepts are substantively different in
ways that reflect the divergent interests of contemporary logicians and
nineteenth-century mathematicians. Indeed, Blanchette argues that
changes to the concepts model and independence have sometimes been
the result of largely contingent choices by the mathematical community.
This genealogy in turn suggests that there is a sense in which the concepts
independence and model are contingent (within the set of communities
interested in mathematics).
Mark Wilson’s (2006) book Wandering Significance is an extended exer-
cise in conceptual genealogy. Wilson traces the historical development of
concepts such as limit, derivative, and line. In each of these cases, he argues
that our mathematical concepts have a certain contingency: the concepts
we have today are the result of historical developments that, at times,
reflect the contingent pragmatic interests of the mathematical
community.
One might interpret Nietzsche (1887) as providing a genealogical argu-
ment for the contingency of our moral concepts.33 Under this interpretive
32For general discussion, see Haslanger (2000).
33See Plunkett (2016) for related discussion.
22 R. SMITHSON
lens, Nietzsche argues that contemporary moral concepts historically
developed as part of an attempt by one community to seek vengeance
on another. This genealogy reveals the contingency of our moral concepts.
Perhaps there are other moral concepts possible for humans to use that
would – according to Nietzsche – better promote human flourishing.
Symmetry arguments: Philosophers sometimes argue for the contin-
gency of a conceptual feature by imagining a linguistic community with
different normative standards than our own. A certain feature of the
rival community’s conceptual scheme may seem defective by our lights,
but the analogous feature in our scheme seems defective by the rival com-
munity’s lights. The symmetry of the situation supports the contingency of
the features in question.
One prominent example of this strategy is Goodman’s (1955) grue com-
munity. Goodman argues that a language employing and projecting the
predicate ‘grue’ is not internally criticizable. We might say that that the pre-
dicate ‘grue’ is unnatural, but the grue-speakers can symmetrically claim
that ‘green’ is unnatural. We might say that the definition of the predicate
‘grue’ involves illicit reference to a specific moment in time, but the grue
community can symmetrically claim that the definition of the predicate
‘green’ involves illicit reference to a specific moment in time. Goodman’s
ultimate conclusion is that our use of the term ‘green’ (rather than ‘grue’)
is not driven by any ‘rational considerations’; instead, it is a result of historical
developments about which concepts are entrenched (roughly: used more
often in projection in the past) in our epistemic community. This can be
viewed as an argument for conceptual contingency: a community with
different affective states (e.g. a community that felt that grue things are
more similar than green things) would use grue instead of green.
I represent the above (alleged) contingencies in Figure 7, with the
(alleged) alternative concepts our community might adopt labelled with
asterisks.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have explained the project of conceptual cartography and dis-
cussed its connections to conceptual engineering. When engaged in concep-
tual cartography, we are interested in mapping the features of a conceptual
scheme that are necessary or contingent for a given linguistic community. To
provide a framework for this project, I first described some of the relevant
ways in which both conceptual schemes and linguistic communities might
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differ from one another. I then interpreted conceptual cartography as the
project of locating conceptual features within the space of possible linguistic
communities according to their necessity/contingency for those commu-
nities. In the final two sections of the paper, I discussed some common
methods for establishing conceptual necessity and conceptual contingency.
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